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ABSTRACT
Evaluating the Usability of Two-Factor Authentication
Kendall Ray Reese
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
Passwords are the dominant form of authentication on the web today. However,
many users choose weak passwords and reuse the same password on multiple sites, thus
increasing their vulnerability to having their credentials leaked or stolen. Two-factor
authentication strengthens existing password authentication schemes against impersonation attacks and makes it more difficult for attackers to reuse stolen credentials on other
websites. Despite the added security benefits of two-factor authentication, there are still
many open questions about its usability. Many two-factor authentication systems in
widespread usage today have not yet been subjected to adequate usability testing. Previous comparative studies have demonstrated significant differences in usability between
various single-factor authentication systems.
The main contributions of this work are as follows. First, we developed a novel
user behavior model that describes four phases of interaction between a user and an
authentication system. This model is designed to inform the design of future usability
studies and will enable researchers and those implementing authentication systems to have
a more nuanced understanding of authentication system usability. Second, we conducted
a comparative usability study of some of the most common two-factor authentication
systems. In contrast to previous authentication usability studies, we had participants use
the system for a period of two weeks and collected both timing data and SUS metrics on
the systems under test. From these studies, we make several conclusions about the state
of usability and acceptance of two-factor authentication, finding that many users want
more security for their sensitive online accounts and are open to using multiple forms
of two-factor authentication. We also suggest that security researchers draw upon risk
communication theory to better help users make informed security decisions.

Keywords: two-factor authentication, usable security, two step verification
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Passwords are the most widespread form of user authentication on the web today [6].
Although a plethora of password-replacement schemes have been proposed, none of them
fully measure up to the deployability and usability attributes of passwords [5]. More
recently, large service providers including Google, Facebook, and Microsoft, have deployed
an optional two-factor authentication layer as part of their authentication processes to
defend against widespread impersonation attacks. A two-factor authentication scheme
requires users to present two of the following types of authentication factors:
1. Something they know (traditionally a password)
2. Something they have (such as a phone or hardware token)
3. Something they are (referring to biometrics, such as a fingerprint)
Two-factor authentication provides a strong defense against remote impersonation
attacks. For example, if an attacker were able to steal or guess a user’s password, the
attacker would still need to compromise the user’s phone or steal a physical token in order
to gain access to the account. Thus, it is significantly more difficult for a remote attacker
to conduct a successful impersonation attack on a user whose account is secured with a
second-factor.
Many forms of two-factor authentication have been proposed. Systems such as
SMS, TOTP (time-based one-time password), and hardware code generators (such as
the RSA SecurID) require the user to enter a 6-digit single-use code in addition to their
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password. These codes are either sent to the user via a separate channel or are generated
on the fly by the user’s device. In commercial and government settings, smart cards
are a commonly used second-factor, requiring the user to insert an ID badge to a card
reader attached to their computer. Online banking systems, particularly in the UK,
frequently use variants of hardware code generators and card readers in their two-factor
authentication implementations. USB hardware tokens, such as the YubiKey, have been
adopted by Google for their employees [18].
The need to properly secure account credentials is further underscored by a number
of recent password database leaks [11]. Because users tend to reuse the same username
and password across multiple sites [9], password leaks from a single site can lead to a
chain-reaction of account compromises as attackers access other accounts with the same
credentials [15]. Two-factor authentication helps prevent these types of attacks, since even
an attacker with knowledge of the user’s password would still be unable to compromise
the account without access to the second factor.
Despite the attractive security benefits of two-factor authentication, its impact
on the user experience remains unclear. A number of previous studies on two-factor
authentication systems have produced results which may appear contradictory. While
one set of studies [13][16][17][29] concludes that two-factor authentication is completely
unusable, others [12][18] have drawn very different conclusions, finding that some twofactor authentication systems are actually very usable.
The most obvious difficulty in trying to draw conclusions from these results as a
whole is that the usability studies and surveys that led to these conclusions were performed
on different sets of users under very different test conditions. Importantly, many of the
studies did not test the same two-factor authentication systems, making it intractable
to determine how the different systems compare in terms of usability. To resolve these
problems, we defined the following set of objectives in our research:
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1. Identify adoption hurdles— According to a 2015 estimate performed by Petsas
et al. [23], only 6.4% of Google accounts have two-factor authentication enabled
and other online service providers have an even lower rate of adoption. Even in
a commercial setting, two-factor authentication adoption was estimated at only
17% by Humphries et al. [14]. We wish to identify any usability hurdles that may
discourage two-factor authentication adoption.
2. Better understand user attitudes about two-factor authentication— In
addition to studying the two-factor authentication systems themselves, we conducted
in-person interviews with participants to better understand how they felt about using
two-factor authentication. This type of qualitative data is essential in understanding
how to design secure systems that integrate well with the needs of everyday users.
3. Study two-factor authentication in daily lives— Many previous studies focused heavily on participants’ experiences using two-factor authentication in a
laboratory setting. Although such studies are helpful as a way to gain initial focus
in identifying obvious usability concerns, one weakness of such studies is that they
do not allow the user enough time to become appropriately acclimated to using the
system itself, thus potentially skewing the usability results downward. In contrast,
we allowed users in our study to experience a two-factor authentication system an
average of 10 times over a period of 14 days before interviewing them. We also
quantified the learnability of each system by measuring the authentication time
each day the participant used the system within the study period.
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Chapter 2
Related Work

In this section, we discuss previous research published in the area of authentication
usability and two-factor authentication usability.

2.1

Summary of Previous Work

Bonneau et al. [5] analyzed a number of different authentication systems and rated their
usability, security, and deployability. They also proposed an evaluation framework for
measuring the viability of newly proposed authentication systems. Importantly, this
work highlights the incomplete and overly optimistic views that authors of authentication
schemes often award their own systems. In contrast to our proposed work, this work did
not perform any studies with end-users.
Braz and Robert [7] demonstrated the conflict between traditional user interface
design strategies and the security goals of authentication systems. Although this paper
did not perform any user studies, it did highlight several flaws with some existing
authentication systems and performed a comparative security and usability analysis of 14
authentication systems. System usability was evaluated using an ad hoc subjective rating
scale.
In 1993, Wood and Banks [31] identified human error as being a significant issue in
computer security, and in 2005 Schultz [27] posited that the computer security problems
were primarily people problems. In 2009, Liginlal et al. [19] found that the number of
privacy breach incidents due to human error were increasing. Although this paper argued
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for more effective organizational policies as an antidote to this increase in privacy breaches,
it also acknowledged the role that poorly designed human-computer interaction played in
these breaches. Norman [22] provides a comprehensive guide to designing usable systems
in general. In this guide, he argues, “in my experience, human error usually is a result
of poor design: it should be called system error.” Usable design is not just a way to
make users “feel good” about using a system; usability is foundational to the security of
the system. Thus, understanding existing usability hurdles in two-factor authentication
systems is a necessary step to improving security on the Internet.
Just and Aspinall [16] surveyed the two-factor authentication systems used by
10 UK banking websites and identified a number of common implementation patterns.
They evaluated both the security and usability of the system, but did not interact with
any end-users of these banks. In 2015, Krol et al. [17] conducted interviews with 21
individuals who used two-factor authentication as part of the login process for several
UK banks. Participants used a variety of two-factor systems, including card readers,
hardware code generators, SMS, phone calls, and smartphone apps that generated singleuse codes. Hardware code generators were particularly disliked by participants; in fact, a
few individuals changed banks because of the difficulty of using the tokens.
Gunson et al. [13] studied two-factor authentication in automated telephone
banking, and found that users reported lower usability of the two-factor systems. However,
users also perceived a higher level of security with two-factor authentication. Participants
in the study were given a hardware code generator and were asked to authenticate with
a simulated telephone banking system. A 7-point Likert-type scale was used to assess
usability via 22 randomly ordered questions. As demonstrated by other studies, users
disliked having to carry a dedicated code generator device around. Furthermore, users
were unsure of how the code generator provided better security to their account as
compared to traditional knowledge-based questions.
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In 2014, De Cristofaro et al. [12] conducted a Mechanical Turk survey of online
users already using two-factor authentication. In this work, they specifically studied
hardware code generators, one-time codes via SMS and email, and smartphone code
generator apps. They found that email or SMS messages were the most commonly used
second-factor for financial or personal sites, but that hardware tokens were most common
for work. Interestingly, this study reported SUS (System Usability Scale) scores in the
‘A’ range for all two-factor systems studied. We validated this work by conducting a
controlled study of users over a period of two weeks.
Weir et al. [29] compared the usability of three variants of hardware code generators
being evaluated by a bank in the UK. The first system would generate a code with the
push of a button. The second and third systems both required the user to insert their
bank card into the code generating device. In addition to inserting the bank card, the
the third system also required the user to enter a PIN using a scroll wheel mechanism.
Participants used each of the three systems, then were interviewed and asked to fill out a
short usability questionnaire. Finally, participants were asked to authenticate once more
using their favorite system. The study found that users would almost always choose as
their favorite the system that they perceived to be the most usable, not the system with
the highest perceived security. Push button hardware tokens were perceived to be more
usable, and total authentication time was significantly less than PIN-secured tokens. In a
similar study, Weir et al. [30] conducted an in-lab study of three authentication systems,
including SMS and hardware code generator based two-factor systems. They found that
participants were most successful using the SMS-based system.
Lang et al. [18] report on Google’s internal deployment of YubiKeys to their
employees. Although this work does not report SUS scores or a similar metric, it does
report a long-term reduction in the number of authentication-related support tickets after
deploying the hardware keys. Further, they demonstrate that overall authentication time
was significantly reduced as compared to other one-time code based systems. Google now
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allows consumers to secure their accounts using YubiKeys as well, though it has only
been until quite recently that such applications have been academically studied.
Ruoti et al. [25] conducted a comparative user study of seven single-factor web
authentication systems using a novel tournament structure. Participants used a small
number of authentication systems to log into a mock forum website and mock banking
website in a laboratory setting. In contrast to many previous works, this study reported
SUS metrics for each of the systems tested. Their results show that users prefer single sign
on systems, but that users still have some qualms about trusting a single sign-on system.
Similarly, we also conducted a comparative study of authentication systems (described
later), though our study differs in that it specifically studied two-factor authentication
and took place over a two-week time period instead of 45 minutes in a laboratory.
Das et al. [10] performed two studies measuring both the usability and the acceptability of the YubiKey on a Google account. In their initial study, the researchers
had participants attempt to set up the YubiKey on their Google account. Employing
a think-aloud protocol, they made a number of recommendations to Yubico based on
common points of confusion. After one year, they repeated the study with a second
group of users, and found that although many of the previous usability concerns had
been addressed, many users still did not see much benefit in using the YubiKey. Das et
al. postulated that this lack of acceptability was due partly to the lack of awareness of the
benefits and risks of using the YubiKey. Also, because the YubiKey worked in addition
to a password instead of replacing it, they point out that there is a net increase in the
cognitive load. One of the key takeaways of this work was to underscore the importance
of clear communication with a user—it is not enough to reduce the number of usability
concerns and assume that the users will follow. Users need at least a basic understanding
of the risks they face and the security benefits of adopting a particular behavior (such as
using a YubiKey for two-factor authentication).
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Concurrent to our study, Colnago et al. [8] conducted a large-scale survey of faculty
and students at Carnegie Mellon University during a campus-wide deployment of the
Duo two-factor authentication system. Duo is a commercial two-factor authentication
product and supports second factor authentication using a smartphone, phone calls,
U2F, and several others. Colnago et al. found that many participants in the survey
recognized the security benefits of using two-factor authentication. They also identified a
number of usability issues with the deployment of Duo. One interesting takeaway is that
the differences in perceived usability between users that voluntarily adopted two-factor
authentication and those that were required to adopt two-factor authentication was fairly
small; many participants that were required to use two-factor authentication reported it
to be easier to use than they expected.

2.2

Analysis of Related Work

It is difficult to draw any certain conclusions about the usability of two-factor authentication in general from the works summarized above. A number of studies demonstrated the
poor usability of several two-factor systems, particularly in the realm of online banking in
the UK, but we caution that these results may not generalize to two-factor authentication
as a whole. Interestingly, results from both Lang et al. [18] and De Cristofaro et al. [12]
indicate that users find two-factor authentication to be much more usable once they
overcome the initial adoption phase.
Largely missing from previous studies is any mention of smartphone-based authentication, which involves the user either using a time-based code-generator app or receiving
a push notification sent to their smartphone. While much previous work studied the
hardware code generators common in commercial settings, these hardware code generators
are not generally supported by consumer-level service providers such as Google and
Facebook. USB tokens such as the YubiKey are used in both commercial and consumer
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settings, but the only published work of the usability of these keys was in a commercial
setting [18].
Attempts to draw conclusions about the overall usability of two-factor authentication are perilous at best—there are simply too many possible systems that would
need to be tested to make an accurate statement about their usability. But even drawing
conclusions about the usability of a single system may be flawed. Reynolds et al. [24]
describes two usability studies of YubiKeys (a type of FIDO U2F compliant hardware
token) recently conducted by our research team. Preliminary results from these studies
indicate that participants found the setup and initialization process of using the YubiKey
to be extraordinarily difficult. In a follow-up study however, participants were guided
through the setup process by a coordinator and asked to use the YubiKey as a secondfactor to authenticate with their Google, Facebook, and Windows accounts for a four
week period. These participants reported significantly higher SUS scores, suggesting that
there is a significant difference in usability between setup process of the YubiKey and the
day-to-day use aspect of using a YubiKey. These results, though still preliminary, indicate
that we need a finer-grained model of user behavior to inform the design of authentication
usability studies.
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Part II

Groundwork
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Chapter 3
User Behavior Model

We now describe a four-phase model of user behavior that describes the way that
users think about and interact with authentication systems. Our behavior model is
specifically intended to improve the quality and specificity of results that can be derived
from authentication user studies, though we believe that this model will be helpful in an
even wider range of product and user study design tasks.

3.1

Buy-in

The buy-in phase is a group of precursor events that happen before the user decides to
adopt a particular system. Although the user traditionally must know about the system
in order to use it, there are examples of zero-interaction authentication systems that may
not require the user to actually know that the system is working or available to them
(e.g., IP-geolocation authentication systems).
If the user is aware of the existence of the system, they must make a decision whether
or not to begin using it. We model this decision in the context of risk communication
theory, which is traditionally used in the public-health and disaster preparedness sectors.
However, researchers such as Blythe et al. [4] have also used risk communication principles
in designing usable security interfaces. We summarize such a risk analysis with three
questions:
1. Awareness—Does the user perceive a risk of compromise for their online account?
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2. Evaluation—What is the significance and likelihood of that perceived risk of
compromise?
3. Efficacy—Does the user believe they can avoid this risk? (And at what cost?)
Studying the usability of a system during the buy-in phase is challenging because
of the large number of variables at play. For example, a user may perceive a system to be
highly usable based on advertising, social connections, or previous experience using other
similar systems. In the context of account security, users may not properly understand the
threats that the system would defend them against or may wrongly estimate their true
vulnerability to attack. Finally, the user may perceive the cost of adopting the system to
be too high (i.e., using the system would require too much time or money). Each of these
factors are examples of the costs and benefits that users may consider when choosing to
use an authentication system. Ultimately, the user will make a decision to either use or
not use the authentication system. If the user chooses to use the system, they will enter
into the adoption phase.
Interviews with users and sentiment surveys are helpful in discerning patterns of
user buy-in for different authentication systems. Usability studies in this stage are mostly
concerned with understanding users’ typical online behavior and can assist with better
discerning how users value security and privacy.

3.2

Adoption

If the user decides to adopt the authentication system during the buy-in phase, then
they will take action on that decision. This action could involve making a purchase (such
as purchasing a hardware token) or could involve entering personal information, such
as entering a cell phone number into a form on a webpage. The boundary between the
buy-in phase and the adoption phase is defined by whether the user has taken a definitive
action with intent to use the system.
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Financial and temporal investments made by the user during the adoption phase
lead to an escalation of commitment when using the system. For instance, if the user
spends $40 purchasing a hardware authentication token, they will be more committed to
spending additional time to setup the token on their accounts and will be more likely to
continue using the system on a daily basis. Because the adoption phase does not usually
require a large amount of time, laboratory user studies are well-suited to understanding
most installation-phase usability concerns of authentication systems.

3.3

Day-to-day Use

When the adoption phase is complete, the user begins the day-to-day use phase. This
phase includes all events that happen during the user’s regular interactions with the
authentication system. In a typical password-based authentication system for example,
this would include the user needing to recall their username and password pair and
correctly input these credentials into the verification system.
Online surveys, such as the survey conducted by De Cristofaro et al. [12], of
individuals already using the system may be helpful for determining its day-to-day
usability. The advantage of such an approach is that surveys are usually able to reach a
much wider and diverse population of users. However, it is difficult to control confounding
factors in such surveys, such as how often and how long the user has actually been using
the system. Furthermore, this approach does not allow testing of unreleased or minimallydeployed authentication systems. As an alternative to surveys, controlled longitudinal
studies provide a way to capture the day-to-day usage aspect of a system, while better
controlling experiment variables. Longitudinal studies may provide the opportunity to
collect more qualitative results through in-person interviews with study participants.
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3.4

Revocation, and Recovery

The revocation and recovery phase includes events outside of the typical authentication
experience. If the user is unable to authenticate using the normal means (due to a lost
hardware token or forgotten password), they will need a way to recover their account. If
the account credentials have been lost or stolen, then they should be revoked in order to
prevent misuse. Presumably, these events will be rare, though more research needs to
be done to determine exactly how often users do need to recover or revoke their account
credentials.
This class of events is difficult to study scientifically, since events requiring revocation or recovery typically happen sporadically over a long time period. Thus, recruiting
and retaining users to participate in user studies could prove difficult. Possibly, study
participants could be required to correctly recover their account at the end of a longitudinal authentication study. However, this approach could risk unduly swaying participants’
view of the day-to-day usability of the authentication systems under study.

3.5

Implications for Usability Studies

We developed this model specifically to inform the way that usability research in the
authentication space is performed. In particular we felt that existing research could
be improved by being more clear about how results obtained in a research setting,
especially laboratory settings, would apply to real-life situations. We believe that a study
designed to study specific phases of usability will generate more concrete, actionable
results. Furthermore, our behavior model highlights the importance of studying areas of
authentication that have previously not received as much as attention, such as the set up
phase and the revocation/recovery phase.

15

Chapter 4
YubiKey Usability

On the basis of our previously described model of user behavior, our research
team designed and executed two user studies to gain insight into the usability of U2F
Security Keys. Both studies are described in more detail in Reynolds et al. [24]. We
include a brief overview of the design and results of these studies because of their critical
role in validating the efficacy of our behavior model and of studying phases of usability
separately.
The purpose of these studies was to explore the usability of the setup and dayto-day phases of participants’ experience in using Security Keys. Previously, Lang et
al. [18] had conducted an internal usability study of Security Keys being used by Google
employees. As compared to other two-factor authentication systems currently in use at
Google, the Security Key performed well, reducing both authentication time and the
long-term number of IT support tickets.
However, participants in the Lang et al. study were not necessarily representative
of everyday consumers wishing to further protect their accounts. Employees that are
required to use two-factor authentication to protect their accounts have a different system
of incentives as compared to consumers protecting a personal account, and may have
access to additional employer-provided resources (such as an IT support desk). Employees
that feel they have nothing to protect personally, and thus reject two-factor authentication
for their personal accounts, may feel more responsible to protect sensitive company
information. Further complicating the usability dynamic of two-factor authentication in a

16

corporate setting, employees that are mandated to use two-factor authentication on their
company accounts may feel resentful or irritated about additional difficulties they may
experience while logging in. By contrast, consumers that voluntarily secure their personal
accounts with two-factor authentication may perceive the two-factor authentication to be
more usable, or at least more worth the trade off as compared to corporate workers. Given
these differences, we designed two studies targeting consumers as opposed to corporate
employees.

4.1

Measuring the Usability of YubiKey Setup

Our first study examined the user experience of setting up the YubiKey on Google,
Facebook, and for a local Windows 10 account. Each of these systems were selected
because they are already widely used and all support authentication with a YubiKey.
By sheer volume of users, Google is thought to have one of the largest deployments
of two-factor authentication, despite having less than 6.4% of its total users that have
enabled two-factor authentication. Facebook similarly boasts a vast set of users, although
it is unclear how many of these users actually use two-factor authentication to protect their
account. Windows 10 supports multiple methods of authenticating with the YubiKey and
has a wide installation base. We felt it important to test the YubiKey in not only a web
setting (Google and Facebook), but also in a local operating system context (Windows
10). Each of these contexts has a differing set of potential threats that the YubiKey could
defend against.

4.1.1

Study Design

At the commencement of each study, participants were given a YubiKey in its original
shipping envelope. We then directed the participant to spend 5 minutes on the Internet
learning about the YubiKey. The intent of this time was to help the participant familiarize
themselves with what a YubiKey was (most participants had not heard of the YubiKey
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before) and to simulate the process of a consumer researching a product online before
deciding to purchase. Beyond telling the participant to, “use the Internet,” we did not
offer any further guidance to the participant during this 5 minute time period.
Following the brief familiarization phase, we asked the participant to set up the
YubiKey on each of the three accounts in turn. We varied the order these tasks were
assigned such that each of the six possible orderings to configure the three systems were
covered an equal number of times. For this study, participants did not use their personal
accounts, instead using account credentials provided by the study coordinator. Although
only Google Chrome and Opera supported the YubiKey at this time, we included desktop
shortcuts for all major browsers supported on Windows 10 at the time: Google Chrome,
Opera, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge, and Internet Explorer.
Participants did not receive any assistance from the study coordinator in configuring
the YubiKey for any of the accounts. In the event that the participant did ask the
coordinator for help, the coordinator would reassure the participant and tell them to
simply do their best. Participants were instructed to tell the study coordinator when
they had completed each task. The coordinator would note whether the participant had
correctly set up the YubiKey for the given account and allow the participant to move on.
Although participants were encouraged to give a good effort to setting up the YubiKey
on each system, we did allow them to abandon a task and move on if they decided that
they would not be able to be successful at configuring the YubiKey within a reasonable
time frame. To ensure that the participant would have enough time to experience each of
the three systems, we limited each task to approximately 20 minutes.
At the conclusion of the three tasks, participants took a brief questionnaire,
including several short answer questions and a standard SUS (System Usability Scale)
survey. We used only a single SUS survey at the end of the study instead of three SUS
surveys after each task because we wanted to understand the overall usability of the
YubiKey itself, not necessarily the particular usability metric of each system; additionally,
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we felt that multiple questionnaires would have made the study overly fatiguing for the
participant.

4.1.2

Setup Results

Participants identified a number of usability problems when attempting to set up the
YubiKey. Problems included outdated documentation, lack of success indicators, and
accidental account lockout on Windows 10. Participants were by far the most successful
in setting up the YubiKey for the Google account, exceeding an 80% success rate. We
believe that Google’s guided “wizard” approach was one reason that participants were
so successful. By contrast, many participants were unable to configure the YubiKey for
Facebook. Many participants mistakenly believed they had been successful at configuring
the YubiKey for two-factor authentication on Facebook due to a misleading dialog box
message telling the user that the YubiKey was ready to be used with Facebook. In reality,
additional steps were needed to complete the two-factor authentication registration
process. Windows 10 faired no better than Facebook with barely over 40% of participants
managing to correctly locate and follow a dense 17-page PDF containing some out of
date instructions. According to notes taken by the study coordinators, participants were
overall much more frustrated by the process of setting up the YubiKey for Windows 10.
Furthermore, in addition to being unsuccessful at configuring the YubiKey, nearly 20%
of the participants also locked themselves out of the machine due to a user interface
flaw. Depending on the exact chain of events, this lockout situation requires booting into
safe-mode or reinstalling the operating system to undo the damage.

4.2

Day-to-day Usability of YubiKeys

Having uncovered several concerns with the setup phase of using the YubiKey, we next
turned our attention to the day-to-day use aspect of using the YubiKey. In particular, given
the somewhat dismal usability findings from the first part of our study, we endeavoured
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to determine how users would then react to the device when using it as part of their
daily lives. We also wanted to test how the form-factor of the YubiKey affected its
usability—the YubiKey comes in both a full sized form-factor and a significantly more
compact Nano form-factor.

4.2.1

Study Desgin

Participants began the study by meeting with a study coordinator to receive their
YubiKey. We assisted each participant in configuring the YubiKey on their personal
Google, Facebook, and Windows 10 accounts. To minimize the risk of participants
accidentally locking themselves out of their account, we also configured other forms of
two-factor authentication (SMS and printed backup codes) for each account. We asked
participants to use the YubiKey whenever prompted, and to use the backup method only
if they were unable to access their YubiKey. Although the YubiKey supports two-factor
authentication on some mobile devices, this support is not consistent. Thus, when logging
into Gmail or Facebook on a mobile device, participants used an alternate form of twofactor authentication, such as receiving a verification code via a text message. Participants
used the YubiKey on their personal accounts for the period of four weeks, after which
they reported back to be interviewed. The interviewer followed a semi-structured pattern,
following a set list of questions, but deviating at their discretion with follow-up questions
to explore any particularly salient points made by the participant. Three researchers
coded each interview with an agreed-upon codebook.

4.2.2

Day-to-day Results

In contrast to the setup phase, the YubiKey performed surprisingly well in terms of
usability during the day-to-day study. Generally, participants felt that the YubiKey was
not overly intrusive, and several mentioned that the key was just as usable (if not more
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so) than SMS two-factor authentication. Nearly all participants (93%) believed that the
YubiKey helped make their account more secure.
In terms of acceptability however, the YubiKey was a mixed bag. Some participants
were enamored with the security benefits of the key and mentioned wanting to purchase
one. Other participants mentioned previous experience with having their (or a friend’s)
online accounts broken into. These participants were much more likely to view the
YubiKey as being useful in protecting themselves online. At the same time, many others
felt that the security benefits were superfluous, claiming, for instance, they had “nothing
to protect”. Similar sentiments were echoed by participants in the concurrent study
performed by Das et al. [10].
These types of negative sentiments suggest that user adoption of the YubiKey, and
more generally of two-factor authentication, will not be driven so much by a user-friendly
interface design (although this is helpful), but by demonstrating how small investments
in better account security can offer longer-term payoffs against lost productivity due to
account compromise. Perhaps the greatest challenge will not be in merely improving the
usability of the YubiKey, but in demonstrating its actual utility in the lives of regular
users.

4.3

Application to Behavior Model

The YubiKey studies were the first application of our novel user behavior described in
Chapter 3. From these studies, we were able to directly identify specific usability problems
(and successes) that were unique to either the set up or day-to-day use phases of the user
experience. These findings would not have been as evident without our novel study design
of studying each phase in isolation. The success of the YubiKey studies demonstrates
the applicability of our model to authentication usability research and bridged the gap
between the way we theorized users would behave in our model and how they actually
behaved in the real world.
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Part III

Two Weeks of Two-factor
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Chapter 5
Background and Objectives

In the Reynolds et al. [24] YubiKey study previously described, we wanted to test
the efficacy of applying the user behavior model described in Chapter 3. This study
allowed us to gain valuable insights into some of the differences in the user experience of
setting up the YubiKey and using the YubiKey on a day-to-day basis. In particular, we
were impressed by the good day-to-day usability results from using the YubiKey as well
as the strong security guarantees made by the U2F protocol. What remained unclear was
whether the YubiKey would hold up to other two-factor authentication systems in terms
of usability.
We found it intractable to compare our YubiKey usability results directly with
results from previous studies on other two-factor authentication systems for several
reasons. Although we had collected numerical SUS scores in both the short and longterm study, these scores were intrinsically tied not only to the YubiKey, but also to the
Google, Facebook, and Yubico application interfaces seen by the users. The complexity of
isolating the usability of the YubiKey itself caused us some reticence in drawing any firm
conclusions about how the YubiKey would compare to any other two-factor authentication
system, particularly, since the research surrounding those systems had used very different
methodologies.
The lack of comparable results between different two-factor authentication systems
is somewhat systemic simply due to the extreme variability in the test conditions and
overall goals of the published research. Furthermore, many of these studies [18][29] either
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focused on corporate authentication or compared two-factor authentication systems that
are not supported by actual online service providers like Google and Facebook. We
were most interested in testing the usability of two-factor authentication systems that a
consumer would be able to enable for their personal accounts in the real world.

5.1

Objectives

Our overarching research objective was to better understand the user experience of using
different two-factor authentication systems available to consumers today. Each of the
following objectives represents a component of this goal.
1. Quantify usability— An important objective was to compare numeric usability
metrics for each two-factor authentication system. To support this object, we
gathered both timing data and SUS (System Usability Score) data for each system
under test.
2. Quantify learnability— We wanted to determine the effect of time and additional
experience on user’s performance in using two-factor authentication. We hypothesized that users would become faster at using two-factor authentication as they
became more familiar with using the system. Supporting our underlying research
goal, we also wanted to compare whether certain second-factor systems were more
learnable than others.
3. Qualitative user-experience analysis— To provide background and context to
our research, we wanted to conduct interviews with individuals to gain more insight
into how they felt about two-factor authentication. We also asked participants more
generally about their online security posture, such as whether they were concerned
about any of their online accounts being broken into, and what steps they had taken
to secure those accounts (such as enabling two-factor authentication). We coded this
data to better understand in aggregate the sentiments expressed by participants.
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5.2

Description of Systems Under Test

Our study compared five prevalent two-factor authentication systems available from many
large online service providers today. A brief description of each system follows below.
1. SMS—The user is sent a six (sometimes seven) digit verification code through a
text message to their mobile phone. Partly because most consumers already own a
mobile phone capable of receiving text messages—99% of Americans according to a
recent Pew study [20]—this two-factor authentication method is one of the most
widely deployed. Potential usability problems may include delayed delivery, lack of
cellular service (such as in a foreign country or remote location), and miscopying
the code from phone to computer.
2. TOTP—This is an acronym for Time-Based One Time Password. To set up this
two-factor authentication method, the user first synchronizes a secret key generated
by the provider to their smartphone, usually by scanning a QR code. In order
to generate a verification code, the app combines the secret with a truncated
timestamp, hashes the result, and truncates to derive a verification code (as with
SMS, usually 6 or 7 digits long). The server verifies the user-supplied code using the
same method. The full specification is described by M’Raihi et al. in RFC 6238 [21].
The advantage of using a TOTP code generator app is that once the secret has
been synced, the user does not need to rely on a cellular provider to deliver the one
time codes—eliminating both a potential attack surface and a problem in usability.
However, if the TOTP secret is stolen from the server or the phone, then the user
could be subjected to an impersonation attack.
Each code is only valid for a set time interval, usually 30 seconds, after which a new
code must be generated. Crucially, this means that users will typically have less
than 30 seconds to actually enter the code because codes can be generated in the
middle of the 30 second interval. However, it is unclear what the exact usability
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Figure 5.1: Example of TOTP authentication through the Google Authenticator interface
implications of this time interval are. Additionally, the smartphone and the server
must both have a clock that is reasonably in sync. As with SMS, the verification
codes still must be manually keyed in by the user, leaving additional room for user
error. According to the same Pew study as above, only 77% of Americans own a
smartphone, meaning that TOTP is not as broadly deployable to all customer-bases
as SMS is. An example of TOTP as seen in the Google Authenticator app is
displayed in Figure 5.1.
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3. Pre-generated codes—This form of two-factor authentication is usually used in
conjunction with other two-factor authentication methods as a backup authentication
method in case the user is unable to access their primary two-factor authentication
method. Implementation is straightforward: the service provider simply generates
a list of verification codes and has the user print or write the codes down. The
length of the list itself is variable and the codes are usually around 8 digits long.
The codes may be used in any order and must be kept secure against theft both on
the server-side and on the user’s end. Because the pre-generated codes are usually
longer than the verification sent through SMS or generated with TOTP, there may
be additional room for user error when entering the codes. Furthermore, the user
must be careful not to lose the medium on which they recorded the codes.
4. Push—In this two-factor authentication method, the user receives a push notification on their smartphone that allows the user to either “Approve” or “Deny”
a login attempt. This technique is supported by Google (through their “Google
prompt”) and is available as a commercial service through Authy OneTouch and
DUO Mobile. The advantage of this system is that there is less chance of user error,
since there are no numbers that must be correctly copied off a phone screen. Push
authentication does require an active Internet connection in order to work, though
this requirement is likely to be fulfilled by virtue that the user is already trying
to login to an online service provider. We hypothesize that not having to type in
numbers, as required by other two-factor authentication systems, will be both faster
and perceived as more usable by participants. An example of an authentication
approval using the Authy app is shown in Figure 5.2.
5. U2F Security Keys—Originally developed through a collaboration with Google
and Yubico, and now sponsored by the FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) Alliance,
Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) is an open standard allows users to use a USB hardware
device to authenticate online. In contrast to the other four two-factor authentication
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Figure 5.2: Example of push-based authentication through Authy OneTouch
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Figure 5.3: Representation of the YubiKey NEO used by our participants
methods described above, the U2F standard itself is designed to be unphishable
and provide more security and privacy protections than other forms of two-factor
authentication.
In order to authenticate with a Security Key, the user must connect the device
to their computer and activate the device when prompted by the website. We
used the YubiKey NEO (pictured in Figure 5.3) in this study, which is a particular
instantiation of the U2F Security Key.
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Chapter 6
Methodology

We conducted a 72-person comparative longitudinal study of two-factor authentication, approved by our institution’s ethics review board. Our study was designed to
achieve our research objectives of being able to compare the usability and learnability of
the five systems described in Section 5.2: SMS, TOTP, pre-generated-codes, push, and
U2F Security Keys.

6.1

Study Design

Participants were divided into 6 groups of 12 participants each. Five of the groups were
assigned to a specific two-factor authentication scheme and the final group was a control
group that used only passwords with no two-factor authentication at all. Each participant
initially met with a study coordinator in order to create an account on the study website.
During this meeting, the participant was given a list of 12 tasks to complete on the
study website over the next two week period (with no more than one task per day). As
part of completing each task, the participant would need to login to the study website
each day using their assigned authentication mechanism. At the conclusion of the two
week participation period, participants reported back to participate in an exit interview
with a study coordinator. Using a combination of authentication event timing data,
survey responses, and qualitative data gathered from the exit interviews, we compared
the usability of the various authentication systems under test and made a number of key
observations and recommendations on the basis of this data.
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6.2

Banking Website

Our test scenario was that of a participant needing to log into an online banking interface
and complete a task, such as transferring money between accounts or paying a bill online.
To support this scenario, we built a simple online banking interface, pictured in Figure 6.1.
The banking interface supported authentication through either a password alone or a
password in tandem with one of the five two-factor authentication systems described
previously.
We automatically recorded and a number of events in the system, including those
surrounding the authentication process. Events were triggered at the beginning and end
of the password login phase and at the beginning and end of the two-factor authentication
segment. Each beginning and completion event were associated through a unique identifier
that allowed us to correlate distinct login attempts for each user. By computing the
difference in the timestamp for a beginning event and the timestamp for its conjugate
end event, we were able to determine the amount of time taken by each event. We used
this data to determine the median authentication time for each two-factor authentication
system as well perform a repeated measures correlation test for each user to determine
the correlation between time to authenticate with two-factor authentication and time
elapsed since they began the study; that is, whether the participant became faster (or
slower) at logging in with more experience.
The frontend of the website was built as a single-page application using the React.js
library. The backend banking and event-tracking systems were built using Sanic,1 an
asynchronous Python 3 HTTP server framework built on libuv. All account information
and logged event data was stored in MongoDB. In order to protect participant privacy,
all passwords were transmitted to our server using TLS 1.2 and were stored at rest using
the Argon2id [3] password hashing algorithm.
1

https://github.com/channelcat/sanic
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Figure 6.1: Example of the banking interface we constructed for our study
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6.3

Recruitment

We recruited 72 participants using flyers posted throughout a university campus. Prospective subjects were told they would need daily access to an Internet-connected computer
with Google Chrome. In order to be considered for the study, potential participants filled
out a short survey to see if they owned an Android or iOS smartphone, or if they owned
a phone able to receive text messages. Participants were then assigned to a particular
study group for which they would be eligible (two study groups required a smartphone,
for instance).

6.4

Demographics

We had a slightly higher number of female participants (38; 55%) as compared to male
participants (31; 44%) in our study. Participants were largely young adults: 18–19
years (3; 4%), 20–29 (61; 88%), and 30–39 (5; 7%). Over two-thirds of the participants (49; 71%) had completed some college but had not yet completed a degree. One
participant had completed only high school, with the remainder having completed an associate’s degree (8; 11%), bachelor’s degree (9; 13%), or master’s degree (2; 2%). Participants
self-reported their level of computer expertise: far above average (13; 18%), somewhat
above average (28; 40%), average (25; 36%), and somewhat below average (3; 4%).

6.5

Setup and Initial Meeting

Participants scheduled an initial appointment to meet with a study coordinator. During
the initial meeting, the study coordinator assisted them in setting up an account on the
online banking interface. We allowed participants to choose their own username and
password, with the only restriction being that the password had to be at least eight
characters long. If the participant was part of one of the study groups using a second-factor
scheme, the coordinator would also help them configure the two-factor authentication
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on their account for the study website. Depending on the study group, this included
helping the participant install any necessary apps, verifying their phone number, issuing
the participant a YubiKey NEO, or printing the backup codes.
Participants were issued a list of 12 tasks that they would need to complete
during the study period. The order of these tasks was generated randomly and the
tasks were designed such that no permutation of their ordering would ever cause any of
the participant’s accounts on the banking interface to overdraw. The study coordinator
assisted the participant in completing the first listed task during the intial meeting, leaving
the participant with 11 tasks to complete on their own.
To avoid confusion and at request of our ethics review board, participants were
expressly told that the bank was only a simulation and that they would not be able to
withdraw or make deposits to any real bank. Additionally, we asked participants not to
use their actual banking credentials for the study.

6.6

Two-week Task Completion Period

Over the next two weeks, participants were asked to complete no more than one task per
day in the order given on their task list. At their discretion, we allowed participants to
skip completion of a task for 1–2 days during the study period.
To complete each task, the participant would need to visit our online banking
website and login with their previously selected username and password. With the
exception of the control group using only a username-password pair, the participant would
also authenticate using their assigned second-factor system for each login. Our event
system recorded all failed and successful login attempts, including timing data for each
attempted login. After logging in, the participant would go to either the “Payments” or
“Transfers” page and complete the banking component of the task.
The purpose of having participants complete the banking-related task after logging
in (as opposed to simply having the individual login and do nothing) was to encourage
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the user to act more naturally during the login process and make the simulation more
realistic—most real-world users do not authenticate for amusement; rather authentication
is a means to an end and not an end itself. Simply, we did not want the authentication
step to become the end goal in the mind of the participant, but rather daily completion
of a banking task, as would be the case using a real banking website.

6.7

Exit Interview

Participants reported back for an exit interview with a study coordinator at the conclusion
of the two-week period. The coordinator would first have the participant take a brief
survey to gather a small amount of demographic data. Participants also completed a SUS
(System Usability Scale) assessment of the website as a whole and for the authentication
system they had used for the study. Following this, the coordinator would conduct a
semi-structured interview with the participant to gather additional information about how
the participant felt about the website overall as well as the login process. In particular,
we asked participants questions about their overall online security posture to better
understand their background and feelings about online security. With consent of each
participant, we recorded audio of each interview. Two coders working together then
listened to the recordings and coded each interview. We selected the codes on the basis
of the questions that the coordinator asked in each interview.

6.8

Compensation

Participants were compensated a maximum of 25 USD at the conclusion of their participation in the study according to a tiered compensation structure they agreed to before
beginning the study. In order to incentivize participants to login to the website and
complete a task, compensation was based on the total number of tasks completed. We
asked participants to self-report the number of tasks they completed in the exit interview
and remunerated them accordingly.
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Chapter 7
Results

We collected both quantitative and qualitative data in this study. Quantitative
data that we collected included timing data for each second factor authentication step
as well as results from a SUS (System Usability Scale) assessment completed by each
participant. We also collected qualitative data by conducting a semi-structured interview
at the conclusion of the study with each participant. We begin with a report of our timing
data and SUS scores, including a statistical analysis of these results. Following this, we
will provide more detail about the results of our qualitative analysis.

7.1
7.1.1

Timing Data
Individual Learnability

We computed the correlation between the amount of time an individual had been in
the study and the amount of time it took them to authenticate. We used the repeated
measures correlation (rmcorr) technique described by Bakdash and Marusich [1] to
estimate the common regression slope for each two-factor authentication system being
tested. Our hypothesis was that participants would get faster over time as they became
more familiar with the two-factor authentication system, that is, there would be a
negative relationship between the amount of time elapsed since beginning the study and
authentication time. Table 7.1 summarizes the repeated measures correlation results for
each two-factor authentication system being tested. We found statistically significant
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Table 7.1: Repeated measures correlation (rmcorr) between amount of time participating
in study versus amount of time to authenticate.
2FA System

p-value

r

df

95% confidence interval

SMS
TOTP
Push (Authy)
U2F (YubiKey)
Printed Codes

0.2797
0.5857
0.0288
<0.003
0.4255

-0.0970 124 (-0.2688, 0.0807)
-0.0494 122 (-0.2251, 0.1294)
-0.2038 113 (-0.3744, -0.0198)
-0.2690 118 (-0.4289, -0.0927)
-0.0760 110 (-0.2595, 0.1128)

(p < 0.05) support for this hypothesis for both push notifications and U2F Security Keys,
but not for the other systems.

7.1.2

Comparison of 2FA Authentication Times

We applied a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance and found there was a significant
difference (p < 0.001, α = 0.05) in the median authentication time between the systems.
We did not include the time that it took the user to enter their password; the observed
authentication times reported here include only the time to get through the secondfactor authentication step. The Security Key (U2F) devices had the fastest median
authentication time, followed by push notifications. These timing results are summarized
in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.1.
Table 7.2: Authentication Time (in seconds), Summary Statistics
Authentication System

Q1

Printed Codes
Push (Authy)
SMS
TOTP (Google Authenticator)
U2F (YubiKey NEO)

11.340 17.230
8.437 11.840
12.950 16.610
10.650 15.050
4.482 9.092

37

Median

Mean

Q3

28.010 25.370
16.130 17.580
18.460 22.090
23.890 23.340
13.010 16.250
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Figure 7.1: Time to authenticate for each second-factor authentication system being
tested.
7.2

Usability Survey Rankings

We administered two SUS (System Usability Scale) surveys to participants at the beginning
of each exit interview session. The first survey considered the usability of the banking
website as a whole and the second had participants consider only the usability of the
login system. The purpose of administering both SUS surveys was to determine how
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large of an impact the banking website itself had on the participants’ feelings about the
authentication system. Additionally, we felt that participants would be more accurate
with their opinions about the login system if we had first given them opportunity to both
consider and express their feelings about the system as a whole; had we only given a SUS
survey on authentication system, we felt participants would be more likely to (incorrectly)
report their feelings about unrelated website features. The SUS results for the overall
website (grouped by the authentication system) are shown in Figure 7.3. Similarly, the
results for each authentication system is shown in Figure 7.2.
We performed a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance and determined that
the authentication system used was a statistically significant (p = 0.02579, α = 0.05)
predictor of the median SUS score for the two-factor authentication system. We also
computed value of ρ = 0.7576 for Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient and confirmed
that there was a significant (p < 0.001) correlation between the overall website SUS scores
and the SUS scores of the individual authentication systems. Summary statistics for each
two-factor authentication system are shown in Table 7.3. Passwords with no second-factor
had the highest median SUS score, with a median score of 95, followed by TOTP (via
Google Authenticator) which had a median SUS score of 88.75.
Table 7.3: SUS Scores for each two-factor authentication system, Summary Statistics
Authentication System

Q1

Median

Password
87.5 95.0
Printed Codes
75.0 80.0
Push (Authy)
72.5 81.25
SMS
68.75 75.0
TOTP (Google Authenticator) 75.0 88.75
U2F (YubiKey NEO)
61.88 75.0
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Mean

Q3

92.5
80.23
81.04
75.0
83.12
73.12

98.75
90.0
92.5
80.0
92.5
93.12
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Figure 7.2: SUS scores for each authentication system being tested.
7.3
7.3.1

Qualitative Results
Previous Experiences with Account Compromise

A few individuals in the Reynolds et al. [24] study mentioned, unprompted, that one
or more of their online accounts had previously been broken into. We followed up on
this result by explicitly asking participants in this study whether any of their online
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Figure 7.3: SUS scores for overall website, organized by authentication system being used.
accounts had ever been broken into. A number of participants (26; 37%) described
experiences with remote attackers taking over their online accounts and a few people
(7; 10%) mentioned that someone they know had had one of their online accounts hacked.
Although not directly a form of online account compromise, a few participants also
mentioned experiences with financial theft from having their credit or debit card number
stolen or having their bank account credentials stolen. Others mentioned having their
41

personal information stolen as part of one or more data breach events, including the
highly publicized Equifax compromise of millions of individuals’ personally identifying
information [2]. When asked how they noticed that the account had been compromised,
most participants said they received an email indicating a new login from a suspicious
location.
P19: “My Facebook account was broken into. . . I received a notification that
someone had logged in from Africa, and I had not been to Africa. I changed
my password, made it a little longer.”
P23: “My Apple account has been hacked before. I had to go on and change
my password. . . . Apple sent me a [message] and said someone had logged in
from Nevada or something.”
P27: “Something happened with my Facebook. . . I clicked on a link someone
sent me, but it wasn’t really from them. I changed my password right away
after I figured it out. Over the summer I had someone spend a bunch of money
from my bank account. I don’t know how that happened—it was really scary;
they spent a lot of money.”
7.3.2

Security and Inconvenience

We asked participants whether they felt that the second verification step while logging in
made them feel more secure. Most participants did feel more secure, although 3 of 12
participants that used the printed backup codes did not feel like the codes added any
additional security to the system.
P6: “I felt like the codes didn’t accomplish anything, because that’s just more
passwords—anyone could guess them.”
We also asked participants if the additional security would be worth the additional
login time or inconvenience they might face when using the second factor system. Several
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people (20; 28%) said the extra security was definitely worth the trade off, and an additional
group (25; 36%) said that they would be willing to use two-factor authentication depending
on the importance of the account.
P25:

“In my opinion it may be a little obsessive for everything, but for

banking it’s something that I actually do want some authentication. I almost
wish that it was a requirement that the bank said, oh here set [two-factor
authentication] up. Because now that I think about it, I don’t know how to
set up two-factor authentication with my bank. If it were an option I would
definitely use two-factor authentication.”
P33: “It was pretty quick, so that was good; I didn’t feel like I had to jump
through a lot of hoops. I can imagine it being nice having an extra wall of
security if it’s your bank information, so that even if somebody else gets your
password, it’s not like they’re going to be able to hack into your account because
they don’t have the [Security Key].”
Some participants were particularly concerned about the centrality and importance
of their email account, particularly considering the potentially large amount of sensitive
data being stored there. For example, one participant reported they had already turned
on two-factor authentication for their Gmail account to gain extra protection:
P24: “I use my email for everything, and so I thought it wouldn’t hurt to
have some extra security. The thought of someone hacking into [my account]
and having everything vulnerable. . . better to be safe than sorry.”
Other participants (9; 13%) expressly stated that they would not be willing to use
two-factor authentication in order to gain additional security because the inconvenience
was too high.
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P37:

“I don’t know how much my level of convenience and my need for

level of security would balance out because for me having something that is
convenient and is at hand is almost more important than having something
that is more secure. . . I know if people hack your credit cards, then the bank
will take care of that and get the money back and so having that extra security
makes me care less about having a second-factor.”

7.3.3

Experience with Compromise and Worth Inconvenience

We hypothesized that participants with previous experience having an account compromised would be more likely to feel that using a second-factor was worth any extra
inconvenience. Using data extracted from coding the interviews, we used Pearson’s
chi-squared test with two degrees of freedom to test the dependence of these variables.
Not all participants expressly talked about both of these variables, thus we analyzed only
participants for which we had coded data for both variables.
Table 7.4: Account Compromise and Inconvenience
Hacked
2FA definitely worth inconvenience 11
2FA sometimes worth inconvenience 6
2FA not worth inconvenience
4

Not Hacked
9
19
5

We observed no statistically significant relationship between a participant’s previous
history with account compromise and whether they felt that two-factor authentication
was worth the inconvenience (χ = 4.6332, p = 0.0986, α = 0.05). One limitation of this
analysis is that it does not consider the exact nature of the previous account compromise
(such as whether financial loss was involved). However, we do note that numerous
individuals independently stated that using two-factor authentication would be worth the
inconvenience at least some of the time, particularly for financial accounts.
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7.3.4

Perception of Likelihood for Account Compromise

Participants expressed a wide spectrum of views on how much value they placed on their
online accounts. Some participants (9; 13%) felt that they had nothing to protect and
would therefore not be a target of criminals.
P5: “I guess maybe because it’s that I don’t have anything to protect. . . I’m
at a stage in my life where nothing I own is that valuable and none of my
information is that wanted that it makes a difference.”
P8: “I mean, you hear a lot about stuff being broken into; I just don’t think
I have anything that people would want to take from me, so I think that’s why
I haven’t been very worried about it.”
P30: “I don’t have a lot of money in my accounts right now, so if someone
stole my money, that would be bad, but its not enough that it would be the end
of the world if I lost all my money— I don’t feel like I’m a target for someone
to steal my stuff. I can imagine in the future if I had a huge retirement fund
or something then I would want that to be more secure.”

7.3.5

Availability of Second Factor Device

In order to login, each participant in the study in one of the two-factor authentication
groups was required to use something external to their computer in order to login, whether
it be the sheet of paper with printed codes, a YubiKey, or their phone. Many participants
(24; 34%) mentioned not having their second-factor immediately available to them when
they needed to login.
P8: “I don’t always have my phone on me, and so if I’m doing something
on the computer, I’m usually doing homework, so I actually try to keep my
phone away from me.”
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P42: “Honestly, once I’m home I kind of just set my phone down and forget
where I put it sometimes, so that was a little bit hard . . . I needed to go find
my phone and pull up the app.”
7.3.6

TOTP Timeout

Although the participants using TOTP (via the Google Authenticator app) were overall
very positive about their experience, 8 of 12 participants mentioned that they had problems
entering the six digit verification code before it timed out.
P30: “I have to type in these numbers so fast or else it’s going to go away.”

7.4

Discussion of Results

In this section, we will further highlight some of the most interesting results of our study
and discuss their meaning in context of usable two-factor authentication.
7.4.1

Relationship between Authentication Time and Usability

Although both push-based authentication and the U2F Security Keys had faster median
authentication times, neither of these systems received the highest median SUS score.
Conversely, TOTP was the highest scoring second-factor system we tested, but had a
median authentication time that was slower than either push or U2F. From our exit
interviews we identified some explanations for this result. First, some participants receiving
push requests through Authy did not always receive the authentication request in their
notification area and instead had to manually open the app and approve the request. It
was unclear whether this was a bug in the Authy or the result of notification configuration
on some participants’ phones. Several U2F participants using both Windows and Mac
operating systems reported a variety of minor troubles getting the YubiKey to work
with their computers (possibly they plugged it in the wrong direction). However, other
participants reported no problems using the YubiKey. Ultimately, participants using
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TOTP reported liking the relative simplicity of the Google Authenticator app. The app
functioned very similarly to SMS, a two-factor authentication system with which many
participants were already familiar while not requiring them to always have cellular service.
We believe that the minor issues encountered by participants using the Authy
app and the YubiKey likely explains most of the lower scores it received. That said, no
authentication system we tested scored extremely poorly in terms of usability, suggesting
that, although there is a noticeable impact on usability from requiring two-factor authentication, the presence of two-factor authentication itself does not doom the system as a
whole to poor usability.

7.4.2

Remember Me?

In our study, we purposely did not provide a “Remember Me” option, thus requiring
participants in the non-control groups to use their second-factor every day. We believe
that some of the usability impacts of needing a second factor could be mitigated by only
requiring the second-factor on new computers or after logging out. This would provide a
similar level of protection against remote attackers while mostly allowing users unfettered
access to their accounts. Some systems allow access for a limited amount of time (30 days
for instance) without requiring a second-factor on the same machine. Participants with
previous experience using such systems (typically for a university login system) made
some remarks to the effect that they were never quite sure when the second-factor would
be required. One solution to this problem would be to have a small count-down displayed
to the user telling them how many days were left until they would need to again provide
their second-factor to avoid the “ambush” effect described by Sasse et al. [26]. Further
research needs to be done to determine the right balance of when to ask the user for
the second-factor again when they have already been logged in previously on the same
machine.
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7.4.3

Acclimation and Likability

One unique design attribute of our study is that participants used their second-factor
repeatedly over a period of two weeks instead of merely using it in a laboratory setting.
Given the weak usability results of previous two-factor authentication studies, we expected
an overall poor usability response. During the exit interviews, we were surprised at the
number of participants that reported an overall positive experience using two-factor
authentication. Many participants wanted to use two-factor authentication for some of
their actual online accounts, but were either unaware it was an option or were unsure
how to configure it. We believe that our participants were more willing to use two-factor
authentication than previously has been reported because in our study they had an
acclimation period to become adjusted to using two-factor authentication.

7.4.4

Differentiating Between High and Low-value Accounts

Although participants generally tended to care less about the security of their social
media accounts, many expressed concern about the security of their banking and financial
accounts. There were mixed feelings about frequently used accounts like email accounts,
however, particularly in balancing whether it would be worth using two-factor authentication for such accounts. Participants generally agreed that they did not want to always
have to use their second-factor to login to their email account when logging in from a
known computer. Other participants felt they had no confidential information in their
email, and that having a second-factor would not be worth the extra login step. In general,
the higher the perceived value of the account, the more likely the participant was to be
willing to use two-factor authentication for the account.

7.5

Limitations

Several limitations were inherent to our methodology. Because our participants were
recruited from a university campus, they tended to be younger and more technically
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savvy than the population as a whole would have been. A sample of university students
would also be more likely to have fewer material assets to be concerned with as discussed
in Sections 7.3.4 and 7.4.4. Additionally because we wanted to capture authentication
timing data, we were unable to have participants use a real banking system or an existing
online account; this may have altered their behavior. Participants also were required to
use two-factor authentication for every authentication attempt, which may have caused
them to acclimate to using two-factor authentication more quickly than would be seen if
two-factor authentication had only been required on new machines. Finally, participants’
discussions of the necessity of two-factor authentication and online security in general
would have been different had we mocked our website as a social media site.
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Part IV

Epilogue
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Chapter 8
Future Work

Based on our behavior model described in Chapter 3, we would like to further
explore several usability components of two-factor authentication. In this section, we
discuss some ideas for potential future areas of research.

8.1

DUO Authentication

DUO offers a commercial two-factor authentication package deployed by many organizations. It supports multiple forms of two-factor authentication, including push, TOTP,
and U2F. Brigham Young University recently required many of its students and faculty
members to begin using DUO two-factor authentication to protect their accounts. Many
current students, when asked about DUO as part of an informal pilot survey, felt that
any extra security that DUO offered was not worth the inconvenience of always having
to authenticate. Because many students at BYU use open access lab computers (such
as those at the library), they are unable to effectively use the “Remember Me” option
which might otherwise lessen the authentication burden. One student in the pilot study
reported that he had purchased a personal laptop expressly to avoid having to go through
DUO authentication on the library computers. Many participants in our two-factor
authentication comparison study (described in Part III) mentioned DUO as being one of
the two-factor authentication systems with which they had previous experience
We are planning to conduct a campus-wide survey about DUO usage to better
understand whether users feel more secure using DUO and to identify actionable usability
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problems. This survey will be sent to both BYU faculty members and current BYU
students. We believe that faculty may perceive DUO to be less burdensome because they
tend to use personal office computers as compared to students that use many different
machines. A potential solution to mitigate some of the usability concerns of DUO would
be to only require DUO authentication while off-campus. However, this approach may
have some unintended security consequences that would need to be examined more closely.
We also want to explore the use of U2F devices with DUO and analyze how this might
change (for better or worse) the perceptions of DUO for both faculty members and
students.

8.2

Comparative Setup Phase Study

Additional studies need to be done to understand the roadblocks in two-factor authentication adoption. Although certainly not the only roadblock, many users in the Reynolds
et al. [24] study experienced problems with poor documentation while setting up the
YubiKey. These issues are likely not limited to the YubiKey itself and poor user experience
during the setup phase may be systemic to many other two-factor authentication systems.
Therefore, we would like to conduct similar studies to the Reynolds study using different
two-factor authentication methods, such as TOTP through the Google Authenticator app
and compare these results to the original study.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion

Two-factor authentication is arguably the most effective means of securing online
accounts against compromise. It is clear moving forward that passwords alone will be
insufficient to protect individuals from determined attackers. There are many concerns
about the usability of two-factor authentication systems that are yet to be addressed. We
believe that our work has made several important contributions to understanding the
usability of two-factor authentication, including:
1. First studies of YubiKey—We were the first to study the viability of the YubiKey
as a means of two-factor authentication. Although there were many concerns with
the setup phase of the YubiKey, we were able to demonstrate fair success of novice
users in setting the key up for Google accounts, suggesting that it is possible for
this phase to be much improved on other service providers. Results from both long
term studies indicate that users are surprisingly accepting of U2F Security Keys as
a form of two-factor authentication.
2. Model the authentication user experience in separate phases—We are the
first to explicitly view the user experience of authentication in separate phases.
Of particular interest is our separation of the setup and day-to-day use phases.
Previous studies have long been limited by confounding these two phases, leading
to results that, on the surface, contradict each other. By studying each phase alone,
it is easier to isolate specific usability concerns that can be mended while avoiding
participant bias.
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3. Importance of long-term usability—Although laboratory studies are helpful,
we firmly believe that understanding how users’ preferences and authentication
performance changes over time is of paramount importance as well. Our second
longitudinal study particularly demonstrated how users’ performance using a secondfactor authentication system can increase over time as they become more familiar
with the system. Laboratory studies are insufficient to show such improvements,
simply because users are not exposed to the system under test for a sufficient amount
of time.
One approach, suggested by Unger et al. [28], is to focus first on building a usable
system, and then build as much security in as possible. A secure system that is unusable
may create more problems than it solves, and in fact may make a system less secure than
before [26]. But ultimately, it is not enough to merely reduce the number of usability
concerns in a security system to a (potentially arbitrary) “acceptable” level.
Although we have focused extensively in this work on identifying such usability
concerns—and this is certainly a critical aspect of building secure computer systems—
merely reducing barriers is not the driving force that will lead users to adopt more secure
practices. Outside the electronic world, industry experts in a number of fields employ
strategies in risk communication to help people prepare for the occurrence of potentially
catastrophic events. The insurance industry has been hugely successful at least in part
because it is effective at communicating risks and mitigation strategies (typically involving
the purchase of a financial instrument from the company) for the most common everyday
dangers faced by the public. Although in most cases these policies are tacitly meant to
mitigate against obvious physical risks—fires, floods, earthquakes, car crashes—insurance
is at its crux a protection against the potential negative financial ramifications of these
events.
There are significant financial ramifications for a malicious account takeover even
on accounts that are not immediately tied to a person’s financial accounts. For instance,
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losing access to an email account would cause significant lost work hours (meaning loss
in pay) as well as potential loss of intellectual assets (meaning loss in future profits).
Social media accounts may seem to have no financial component until one considers the
potential social-capital loss stemming from malicious posts made on a user’s account
by an attacker, not to mention the value of any private information being stored in the
account that would enable impersonation attacks. This is not to mention the potential
domino effect of compromised accounts; information in one account reveals additional
accounts to target, as well as additional information about the user to enable further
compromise of their identity.
By no account is communicating these cyber-risks to users a trivial task, nor is
there an exact mapping between the risks we face in the physical world and those we face
in the cyber world. People frequently purchase insurance plans for high-value physical
objects—such as a house or car—because it is more clear what is being protected. What
is not as clear is how we can appropriately communicate the risk of account compromise
for a user’s email account—an intangible good that they paid nothing for.
At the same time, many users do care about security in general, and many are
open to exploring two-factor authentication as an option for additional security. From our
research, we find overall that users are not apathetic about account security; rather, they
simply do not have enough information to be able to judge their amount of online-risk
and take appropriate mitigating steps. Two-factor authentication is no silver bullet for
improving the users’ online security. However, it is critical that researchers evaluate
existing systems in terms of usability and likewise consider usability as a component for
new two-factor authentication schemes.
Our user behavior model forms the foundation for a new generation of authentication usability studies. We have demonstrated the viability of this model by conducting
multiple user studies of various two-factor authentication systems. These studies have
provided a valuable snapshot of the state of two-factor authentication usability and we
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have been able to identify several usability successes and concerns from these studies. We
look forward to many more authentication usability studies that will inform the design
and improvement of two-factor authentication and protect millions of users from account
compromise.
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Appendix A
Materials for Comparative Study

A.1

Exit Survey Questions

Question 1. Ask the study coordinator which group you are in.
• SMS
• TOTP
• Printed Codes
• U2F
• Push
• Password
Question 2. Please select your gender:
• Male
• Female
• Other
Question 3. Please select the range that includes your age:
• 18–19
• 20–29
• 30–39
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Website Usability Study
We are conducting research on website usability. We
are looking for participants that have daily access to
a computer with Google Chrome.
●
●
●
●

Study lasts for 2 weeks and will take about 75
minutes total
Must be able to complete short tasks online
each day for two weeks
You will meet with a study coordinator twice
Compensation is between $10 and $25
depending on number of tasks you complete
Find out more at: h
 ttps://signup.bofb.us

Internet Security Research Lab
2236 TMCB
Provo, UT 84602
801-422-7893

For questions, contact:
Kent Seamons
seamons@cs.byu.edu
2230 TMCB
Provo, UT 84602
801-422-3722

Figure A.1: Flyer used to recruit participants in comparative authentication study
(Part III)
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• 40–49
• 50–59
• 60+
Question 4. Please select your highest level of education:
• Some High School
• High School Diploma or Equivalent
• Some College, No Degree
• Associate Degree
• Bachelor Degree
• Masters Degree
• Professional Degree
• Doctorate Degree
Question 5. How computer savvy do you consider yourself?
• Far above average
• Somewhat above average
• Average
• Somewhat below average
• Far below average
Question 6. In the following survey, the word “system” refers to the banking
website you used. All questions must be answered. If you feel you cannot answer one of
the items, mark the neutral on the scale. Please record your initial reaction after carefully
reading each question. (Possible answers: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree,
and Strongly Agree)
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1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently.
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex.
3. I thought the system was easy to use.
4. I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this
system.
5. I found the various functions in this system were well integrated.
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system.
7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly.
8. I found the system very awkward to use.
9. I felt very confident using the system.
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system.
Question 7. In the following survey, the word “system” refers to the authentication
system you used. All questions must be answered. If you feel you cannot answer one of
the items, mark the neutral on the scale. Please record your initial reaction after carefully
reading each question. (Possible answers: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree,
and Strongly Agree)
1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently.
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex.
3. I thought the system was easy to use.
4. I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this
system.
5. I found the various functions in this system were well integrated.
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system.
7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly.
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8. I found the system very awkward to use.
9. I felt very confident using the system.
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system.
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